The paper offers a framework to explain large
scale
effective practices of sharing private, excludable goods.
It starts with case studies of distributed
computing and carpooling as motivating problems. It
then suggests a definition for “shareable
goods” as goods that are lumpy and mid-grained in size, and explains
why goods
with these characteristics will have systematic overcapacity relative
to the
requirements of their owners. The paper
then uses comparative transaction costs analysis, focused on
information
characteristics in particular, combined with an analysis of diversity
of motivations,
to suggest when social sharing will be better than secondary markets to
reallocate this overcapacity to non-owners who require the
functionality. The paper concludes with
broader observations
about the role of sharing as a modality of economic production as
compared to markets
and hierarchies (whether states or firms), with a particular emphasis
on
sharing practices among individuals who are strangers or weakly
related, its
relationship to technological change, and some implications for
contemporary
policy choices regarding wireless regulation, intellectual property,
and
communications network design.